With full-time jobs, hourly wages are appropriate primary indicators of job quality. However, in sectors where full-time schedules do not dominate, total hours matter for job quality and worker outcomes. We explored hour levels and trends in retail trade and its largest subsector, grocery stores. Retail is known for part-time and short shifts. With a comparison of retail hours in three countries-the United States, Canada, and Mexico-we contribute insights into aspects of the U.S. policy and regulatory systems that could be altered in order to improve retail jobs.
In settings where most workers have full-time schedules, hourly wages are appropriate primary indicators of job quality and worker outcomes. However, in sectors where full-time schedules do not dominate-primarily service-producing activities-total hours matter, in addition to hourly wages, for job quality and worker outcomes.
We have explored hour levels and trends in a service sector, retail trade, and its largest subsector, grocery stores. Retail is known for the prevalence of part-time and short shifts to cover peak shopping hours. We examined retail hours in three countries-the United States, Canada, and Mexico-because work hours regulation and customs vary cross-nationally. This comparison contributes insights into aspects of the U.S. policy and regulatory systems for employment, and for retail in particular, that might be altered to improve retail jobs and their implications for workers.
RETAIL HOURS-CAUSE FOR POLICY CONCERN
Insufficient work hours have been a long-standing concern for U.S. workers; in 1985 one out of four workers would have preferred more hours, even at the same hourly rate of pay (Shank 1986 ). In retail, the issue of insufficient hours is ubiquitous. Retail schedules are driven by the goal of providing large windows of shopping time, notably seven-day operation including nonstandard hours. (Grocery stores are under great pressure to move to 24/7 operation.) Retailers also experience wide swings in labor needs throughout the day and week, just as other directservice sectors do. They also have seasonal as well as less predictable swings in demand over the year. The prevailing human resource strategy in retail has, since the 1980s, entailed the heavy use of part-time workers, who receive few or no benefits, particularly in grocery retail. In recent years, part-time work has spread to new parts of retail and can entail very low guaranteed weekly hours but an expectation that workers "flex up" to 40 hours on demand.
Today, even the full-time-hours guarantee falls below 40 hours, and even below 35, as we observed in recent fieldwork entailing 195 interviews in 16 food and consumer-electronics chains during [2005] [2006] [2007] . The implications of these patterns for the workforce are significant.
Lower standard hours reduce the base level of weekly earnings that workers-full-time and parttime-can rely upon. Additionally, we and others have observed that keeping work hours low generates variability and unpredictability in individuals' total hours and in the distribution of these hours. Variability and unpredictability in earnings and schedules affect workers' ability to make financial plans and as such also can affect workers' ability to schedule other incomeearning activities, or can affect their personal and family life. For these reasons, retail work hours and the firm strategies and institutional factors that drive them warrant attention.
In Canada and Mexico as well as the United States, long and expanding hours of operation create two managerial goals. The first is to control labor costs with lean staffing; the second is to closely match staffing levels to customer flow. However, in the United States and Canada, these twin goals lead retailers to shorten employee work hours and expand part-time jobs, whereas in Mexico they lead them to lengthen hours.
The three countries provide a useful comparison. Not only do they lie in close geographic proximity, but they also share many of the same retail chains. Wal-Mart is the largest retailer in both the United States and Mexico and is one of the top retailers in Canada as well. Formal retailers share similar market strategies in all three countries, and, in particular, Wal-Mart is a major driver of market change in each of the settings. Yet the labor market and social protection institutions of the three countries are quite distinct, with important implications for hours of work. We have examined the institutional features that underlie differences in retail-hour patterns. This cross-national comparison supports our thinking on policy options for addressing the work-hour challenges in U.S. retail.
HOUR LEVELS AND TRENDS IN CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND MEXICO
We expected and found different levels and trends in retail hours across the three countries in recent decades. 1987 -2009 34.13 Total, all employees, 1987 -2009 36.69 All private, all employees, 1998 /2003 /2008 47.66 Nonsupervisory, 1987 -2009 30.65 All employees, 1987 -2009 33.04 All employees, 1998 /2003 /2008 (Economic Census) 51.57 Nonsupervisory, 1998 /2003 /2008 51.94 Nonsupervisory, 1990 -2009 31.08 All employees, 1990 -2009 30.50 All employees, 1998 /2003 /2008 54. have very long hours. The pattern of cross-national differences is robust, however we look at the data.
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Trends in Canada and the United States
In Canada and the United States, time trends for employee hours are negative for total, retail, and grocery employment, but the negative time trend is more marked in Canada than in the United States. Canadian retailers have adopted labor deployment patterns similar to those in the United States. The shift to high use of part-time and short regular hours came later in Canada 
Trends in Mexico
The Mexican evidence is fragmentary and mixed. We compared trends within each of two data series-we did this both because of data limitations and in order to highlight longerterm effects rather than cyclical ones. The average weekly hours for both wage and self- 
HOW INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT MATTERS: THREE PATTERNS
Patterns of hours reflect sector-specific strategies but also significant differences in institutional environments-notably between Mexico and its two northern neighbors, but also to some degree between the United States and Canada.
The First Two Patterns: Canada and the United States
Retailers have parallel practices in Canada and the United States; they control unit labor costs by paying lower hourly wages and extending fewer benefits to part-time, entry-level workers than to full-time workers in most cases. In some cases, they institute two-tiered wage structures, whereby recent entry-level hires receive a lower wage than equivalent workers who have been with the firm longer.
Still, these practices take place against a backdrop of institutional characteristics with significantly different implications. The U.S. institutional environment has a bearing on retail jobs that is best characterized as regulatory "flexibility." Retail hours of operation are not regulated at the federal and state level; local regulation generally involves few (and diminishing) statutory limits on opening hours. Customary regulation of opening and work hours is likewise minimal at this point; Sunday and holiday work is nearly ubiquitous and is decreasingly rewarded with a pay differential, and the same holds for evening hours. Retail entry-level wages are pegged at or only slightly above the minimum wage, which is low and has declined in real terms. High rates of part-time workers (28 percent of workers were part-time in 2007), and the associated lack of employer-based benefits, have significant consequences for workers.
Collective bargaining, which historically has improved compensation, covers a declining share of workers (6 percent in retail, and 22 percent in grocery in 2004). As a result, the union "threat effect" (that is, the pressure on non-union companies to adopt compensation levels close to collectively bargained ones in order to avoid unionization) is also weak.
Canada's institutional environment represents a form of "constrained flexibility"-its industry regulation is broadly similar to that of the United States, but there are different norms with regard to labor standards and social protection. The legal and customary regulation of Canadian retail, particularly grocery retail, has retained significant rates of collective bargaining coverage, which has had a consequent positive impact on compensation. In 2004, collective bargaining coverage amounted to 15 percent in retail and 42 percent in grocery. In recent years, provincial minimum wage levels have remained higher, relative to the average wage, than the levels of the U.S. federal minimum wage.
The Third Pattern: Mexico Presents a Contrast to Canada and the United States
In contrast, the institutional structure regulating Mexican retail jobs can be characterized as "unevenly regulated dualism." While much of Mexican retail takes place in informal and family businesses, the country has a growing number of hypermarkets comparable to those in the United States and Canada. Microunits typically evade regulation, but even larger stores face a regulatory regime quite distinct from that in the other two countries.
Mexican institutions, particularly those regulating employment, motivate employersespecially retailers -to set longer hours. Four elements of the institutional environment of larger stores have a particular impact: 1) a long work week, 2) the daily minimum wage, 3) universal social insurance, and 4) weak unions. Mexico's full-time work week is 48 hours (six days times eight hours), with overtime provisions only applying beyond this point. The Mexican minimum wage is set by daily pay and not hourly pay. Mexican law also mandates universal social insurance (through employer contributions), though the level is low and workers with greater market power generally get plans above the minimum. These three provisions weaken the incentive to use part-time employment: 1) the 48-hour week facilitates covering weekends without part-timers, 2) the minimum wage sets a daily pay floor that vitiates the cost advantage of short-hour workers if the wage level is close to the minimum, and 3) universal social insurance bars (at least as a matter of law) a strategy of excluding part-timers from the most expensive benefits. The daily wage, however, also sets an economic incentive to press workers to work beyond the statutory eight hours-a pressure that has increased in the low-growth period of the last 20 years. Finally, the bulk of retail unions negotiate so-called "protection" contracts (whereby corrupt union leadership colludes with management) that offer workers little if any representation.
OPTIONS FOR MAKING A DIFFERENCE TO U.S. RETAIL WORKERS
Making a difference for retail workers entails shifting the hours regime and mitigating the consequences of job limitations for workers. Any policy change under consideration must take into account interactions among institutional factors, available workforces, and retailer competitive strategies.
In the United States, institutional features that historically had maintained hour levels and predictability-i.e., store-hour restrictions and collective bargaining-have been removed or weakened. Several approaches might bring improvement: instituting parity, or reducing differentials, in compensation between full-time and part-time workers; limiting store hours, or at least halting the ubiquitous pressure to move toward 24/7 operations; and compelling businesses to make changes in their practices that would modify the terms of their decision-making on how to deploy their labor.
Altering the terms of decision-making for store management would most effectively be achieved by reducing the substantial cost differentials between full-time and part-time workers, a change that would only come about through economy-wide policy changes. A floor of health insurance coverage would reduce this differential.
It is unclear, as of now, how the 2010 health insurance reform (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act) will affect the cost differential between full-time and part-time workers and retailers' staffing decisions. A "large employer" mandate to cover full-time workers is scheduled to come into force in 2014; it would apply a penalty to the employer for each full-time worker who was not provided affordable health insurance and who relied on a tax credit to pay the premium under the individual mandate. The head count of how many full-time versus how many part-time workers a firm employs will not come into play in exempting employers from the mandate because a threshold of 50 full-time equivalents will define "large" employers. The full-time threshold of 30 or more weekly usual hours over the year may raise implementation issues for retailers who routinely schedule ostensibly "part-time" workers for over 30 hours on a
week by week basis. (These issues are being raised in IRS technical releases.) It remains to be seen whether this clause compels de facto eligibility for these workers. Also to be seen is whether-with the gradual reduction of the full-time standard to as little as 32 hours among retailers-some retailers may simply assign the bulk of their workforce to usually scheduled hours below 30 in order to avoid providing coverage or paying the penalty. Currently, health coverage for full-timers is discretionary and thought to induce employee retention and commitment; once rendered a mandate, it may lose appeal as a human resource management tool. In this latter case, the mandate could be argued to foster short-hour (under 30) staffing practices.
Still, the universal-coverage goal of the reform lessens the deleterious implications of being part-time, relative to the prereform system, because part-timers will gain access to a health insurance floor through insurance exchanges and subsidies. At the same time, as an unintended consequence of this new alternative, the mandate may stunt an incipient trend among a few large retailers to cover part-timers in their company plan.
Like health insurance, mandated paid-time-off minima (e.g., sick time or vacation) would contribute to reducing the cost differential between part-time and full-time workers.
Also, given that entry-level retail wages are pegged at, or a bit above, the minimum wage, a higher real value of the minimum wage would also reduce incentives-as well as opportunities-to organize work and to staff stores in ways heavily reliant upon large numbers of low-paid workers willing to flex up to 40 hours. Higher hourly wages may reduce worker availability to work extra hours on short notice, a labor supply effect. A higher minimum wage compresses the wage distribution, so it will likely contribute to reducing hourly cost differentials between entry-level part-timers and higher-level full-timers. Separating out a section of the store into a "convenience store" format with extended open hours would similarly reduce the managerial challenge of "coverage" (and free up resources). To some extent, large chains such as Wal-Mart and Tesco's Fresh & Easy have begun this exploration by experimenting with small-store formats catering to convenience and specialty-food needs.
A look at the experiences of five European countries with retail scheduling also expands the range of possibilities for U.S. retailers to consider. While the common practice in U.S. grocery stores is to inform their workers of their upcoming work schedules anywhere from three days to (rarely) two weeks in advance, Western European retailers give more advance notice.
Collective bargaining agreements in Germany require 26 weeks' notice, while those in Denmark require 16 weeks' notice. While these requirements are breached regularly, practice remains a far cry from U.S. "just in time" notification. Also French retail collective-bargaining agreements have set a minimum weekly hours limit of 26 hours. The agreement makes significant exceptions, and most cashiers work hours that fall below that threshold. Yet the minimum acts as a deterrent: whereas in 2007 some 18 percent of U.S. retail workers usually worked less than 15 hours a week, and 34 percent worked less than 20, in France in 2006 only 10 percent and 16 percent, respectively, did so. (See Carré and Tilly 2012 for sources.)
Of course, implementation of these approaches could also be achieved through collective bargaining, were union membership in the industry to grow.
CONCLUSION
The low level of regularly scheduled work hours and even their variability have become key features of low job quality for U.S. retail workers. These features have policy implications in terms of the economic impacts of low regular earnings and the scarcity of employer-provided
